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Abstract
Public water systems are an integral part of community infrastructure. Drinking water
contamination or service disruptions have the potential to cause economic losses, limit fire
suppression capability, and result in human illnesses. Until 2016, the United States federal
government had not issued a disaster declaration due to contaminated water. The first federal
drinking water disaster declaration due to contaminated water serves as a sentinel event
demonstrating the need to increase focus on public water systems during all phases of emergency
management: mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Previous studies evaluating risks
to vulnerable populations associated with drinking water primarily utilized qualitative research
techniques. This study compiles and analyzes data from three databases to quantitatively
evaluate potential public water system characteristics that may lead to increased risk. Two of the
three databases are maintained by the federal government, while the third is maintained by a
nonprofit organization. Historically, it has been assumed that smaller systems and systems in
disadvantaged communities would experience lower water quality. This study presents a method
to quantitatively evaluate these types of hypotheses. This study evaluates data from public water
systems within the states of Illinois and Texas. The results indicate that smaller water systems
are more likely to receive regulatory violations than larger systems. In addition, the results
suggest that communities with a higher social vulnerability index are more likely to experience
elevated levels of nitrate.
Keywords: drinking water, social vulnerability, emergencies
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Introduction
What is a disaster? The Stafford Act defines major disaster as “any natural catastrophe
(including any tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire,
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President
causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under
this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused
thereby” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b, p. 1). The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has also released a broader definition of disaster, which it defines as an “adverse
condition or occurrence that requires coordinated action across multiple entities and/or levels of
government to resolve” (DHS, 2017, p. 178).
The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) stated that the purpose of
emergency management is to create “the framework within which communities reduce
vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters” (IAEM, 2007, p. 4). The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) reported that federal disaster declarations through 2015 have
related to incidents such as terrorist attacks, fires, snowstorms, flooding, and severe storms
(FEMA, n.d.). In 2016, a new type of disaster was declared for the first time--an incident in Flint,
Michigan resulted in the first federal emergency declaration related to contaminated water
(White House, 2016). The Flint incident confirmed that emergency managers may now be asked
to consider or respond to threats to drinking water infrastructure. The new challenge for
emergency managers is to develop techniques to optimally assess and mitigate potential hazards
facing public water supplies.
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How are drinking water systems structured in the United States? Drinking water systems
each correspond to a regulatory classification, as depicted in Figure 1, which was originally
published by Paine and Kushma (2017). In the United States, regulations under the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) cover public water systems (PWSs). The SDWA excludes systems
that do not meet the definition of a PWS. A PWS “provides water for human consumption
through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at least 15 service connections or serves an
average of at least 25 people for at least 60 days a year” (EPA, n.d.b, n.p.). Small systems, such
as a household well, are not covered by the SDWA. Some schools, shopping malls, and trailer
parks are considered PWSs. Ownership of a PWS may be either private or public. Approximately
90% of Americans receive drinking water through a PWS (EPA, n.d.b). PWSs are further
divided and may be classified as a community water system, a non-transient non-community
water system (NTNCWS), or a transient non-community water system. Notably, non-PWSs and
unregulated PWSs are outside the scope of this case study.
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Figure 1
Drinking Water System Classification

PWSs and their regulators differentiate between two types of source water—ground
water and surface water. This bifurcated classification of source water was created for simplicity,
as Winter et al. (1998) have outlined how ground water and surface water interact with one
another and therefore are, in a larger sense, part of a single resource. The precise relationships
between source water and ground water are beyond the scope of this study. The drinking water
industry delineates between ground water and surface water and this study follows the same
convention. Ground water is stored in aquifers beneath the Earth’s surface and is pumped up
through a drilled shaft for treatment. Surface water comes from lakes, reservoirs, rivers, or
streams. Ground water is normally easier to treat because it is better protected. Surface water,
due to excess dirt and dissolved particles, typically requires surface water treatment plants to
have extra treatment processes (CDC, n.d.). The first extra treatment processes are coagulation
and flocculation, which are “the clumping together of very fine particles into larger particles
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(floc)…[then] gathering [them] together…by a process of gentle mixing” (Sacramento State,
2017, p. 126). Another extra treatment process is sedimentation, which is the settling out of
suspended particles.
The first recognition that drinking water could result in a public health disaster occurred
in London in 1854 during a cholera outbreak. Dr. John Snow was able to pinpoint the source of
the outbreak to a specific contaminated well (BBC, 2014). Large-scale efforts to treat water to
prevent infection did not occur until 1908, when Jersey City became the first city to provide
disinfection to its water supply (EPA, 2000). The U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) released
water quality standards in 1914, although they initially only applied to “interstate carriers like
ships and trains, and only applied to contaminants capable of causing contagious disease” (EPA,
2000, n.p.). The USPHS updated their standards periodically, and were the de facto industry
standard until the SDWA was enacted in 1974. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has
attributed improvements in PWS operations as a major factor in the reduction of infectious
diseases in the twentieth century (CDC, 1999).
The SDWA was amended in 1986 and 1996 and remains the framework for drinking
water quality in the United States. Initially, the SDWA was focused on water treatment although
the later amendments expanded into “source water protection, operator training, funding for
water system improvements, and public information” (EPA, 2004, p. 1). This law enables US
states to assert primacy enforcement responsibility of the SDWA within their own borders. States
and territories that do not assert primacy receive SDWA enforcement from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In this document, unless otherwise specified, the
acronym Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will refer to the federal-level EPA, as
opposed to state-level equivalent agencies. Currently, all states and territories exert primacy
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except for Wyoming and the District of Columbia. The Navajo Nation also exerts primacy,
although all other tribal lands receive SDWA enforcement from the EPA.
In addition to water quality, the federal government is in the process of implementing
America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018, which requires water systems “serving
more than 3,300 people to develop or update risk assessments and emergency response plans”
(EPA, n.d.a, n.p.). A key component of the new law is to identify and mitigate potential acts of
human malevolence. In addition, it also addresses risks associated with improper technical
management of PWSs. The new requirements include both risk assessments and emergency
response plans. The AWIA, in combination with the SDWA, has resulted in the generation of
assessments, tools, and reports that could be shared with emergency managers.
The AWIA (2018) affirmatively considers drinking water systems to be part of the
American infrastructure. Additionally, FEMA (2019a) defined essential community lifelines as
“those services that enable the continuous operation of critical government and business
functions and are essential to human health and safety or economic security” (p. ii). PWSs may
therefore be considered as both critical infrastructure and as essential community lifelines.
PWSs, as such, have a relationship with emergency management professionals. However, the
specific role of emergency managers with respect to PWSs remains ambiguous. This study
explores the body of emergency management literature that may facilitate a better understanding
of the relationship between emergency managers and PWSs.
What defines a health hazard that must be addressed through a governmental response?
The federal regulations that implement the SDWA (1974) defined conditions that constitute a
health hazard in 40 CFR Part 141—National Primary Drinking Water Regulations. Additionally,
state governments that maintain primacy for the SDWA may publish more stringent state-level
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guidance. Operators of water treatment facilities must be licensed and, as such, utilize trained
personnel and are legally bound to protect the public. The Environmental Working Group
(EWG), has suggested that the federal regulations are not sufficiently stringent to protect human
health (EWG, 2019). Additionally, many communities have difficulty implementing the
regulations. Organizations such as the National Rural Water Association work to provide
technical assistance to these communities (NRWA, n.d.).
Incidents involving drinking water that have the potential to impact human health occur
on a routine basis. However, there had never been a federal emergency declaration for “water
contamination” until 2016 (FEMA, n.d., n.p.). How have threats to drinking water historically
been managed? This question also applies to how current drinking water threats, which do not
rise to the level of a declared emergency, are handled. Health advisories are issued when “water
quality is or may be compromised” (CDC, 2016, p. 10). Alternately, a health notification is more
serious and is triggered by specifically-defined regulatory violations or an actual disease
outbreak (EPA, n.d.c). In some cases, natural disasters such as hurricanes or floods may severely
damage drinking water systems. These situations will typically result in a declared emergency,
although the emergency is not directly attributed to a degraded water system. The novel aspect of
the Flint emergency is that contaminated water was the stated cause of the emergency
declaration.
The quantitative portion of this study focuses on Texas and Illinois. Why does the
quantitative portion of this study focus on these two states? The SDWA (1974) is enforced at the
state level. Therefore, comparing data regarding regulatory violations across state lines may
contribute to a loss of face-validity. Texas and Illinois were selected among the fifty states
because they are large, diverse, and provide the public with large amounts of information and
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data. At least eight states both utilize propriety software to aggregate drinking water sampling
data and publically display the resulting information. The eight known states are: Texas,
California, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Alaska, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois. Texas and
Illinois are large states, and they possess a diverse array of communities with respect to the
Centers for Disease Control social vulnerability index (SVI). Texas and Illinois provide the
public access to drinking water quality data associated with specific PWSs (TCEQ, n.d.; IEPA,
n.d.).
Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study
The broad problem that this study seeks to address is that drinking water safety is at risk
globally although the risks are not well understood and emergency management professionals
have not historically sought to reduce those risks. What does it mean to state that the risks are
not well understood? It means that meta-data has not yet been analyzed to determine the causes
of negative PWS outcomes—increased regulatory violations or elevated contaminant levels. This
case study seeks to quantitatively assess potential relationships between various parameters and
negative PWS outcomes. For example, it is generally assumed that socially vulnerable
communities would have elevated contaminants in their water. This case study seeks to
quantitatively evaluate the data to make a determination.
What does it mean to state that emergency managers have not historically sought to
reduce risks associated with PWSs? A FEMA (n.d.) publication indicates there has never been a
federally recognized disaster attributed to a PWS in the United States until 2016. When PWSs
place their populations at risk, they are statutorily responsible for executing all of the risk
communication to the public in conjunction with the primacy agency (SDWA, 1974). Absent
formal disaster declarations, which are extremely rare, there are no formal mechanisms to utilize
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emergency management professionals to participate in risk communication associated with PWS
failures.
The negative outcomes that are assessed quantitatively by this case study are regulatory
violations and elevated contaminant levels. However, this case study also discusses non-routine
engineering upgrades that have the potential to impact the community. Currently, no databases
are available that contain applicable meta-data associated with major engineering upgrades to
PWSs. Therefore, incidents such as the one that occurred in Flint are reviewed from the
qualitative, rather than the quantitative, perspective. The Flint disaster occurred during a major
project to procure raw water from a different source—it was not initiated through the failure of
existing procedures and equipment. Research for this case study did not identify any other recent
examples of a city the size of Flint changing its source of raw water on a compressed timeline.
All aspects of potential risks to the water supply are worthy of evaluation by emergency
managers. Meta-data, when available, can be evaluated to assess risks. In addition, when
engineering projects fail, such as in Flint, they should be qualitatively evaluated to seek lessons
learned. This paper evaluates both quantitative and qualitative data to identify methods to reduce
risk during mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Emergency managers in the present
and future may be concerned with all risks to their communities, including risks associated with
PWSs.
Integration of the mitigation and preparedness phases of emergency management
associated with PWSs has been addressed by a number of EPA publications. A primary method
of mitigating disasters associated with PWSs is to assure that water operators have proper
training and certification. The system of training and certification is non-standard in that each
state has its own regulations. The EPA has provided a Summary of State Operator Certification
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Programs which helps explain the complicated system, although there are no plans to reduce
complexity within the system (EPA, 2016b). Drinking water operators work with professional
engineers, whose certifications are also issued at the state-level. Mitigation and preparedness
tools also include a variety of checklists issued by the EPA, such as the Incident Action
Checklist--Flooding (EPA, 2015a).
Response and recovery to PWS disasters remain largely under the regulatory umbrella of
the SDWA. In this sense, PWSs and primacy agencies follow the SDWA rather than regulations
that flow through emergency management channels. However, the federal government has issued
non-binding guidance on how PWSs and emergency managers are able to increase
communication and work more closely together (EPA, 2018). For example, the EPA (2018)
publication Connecting Water Utilities and Emergency Management Agencies recommends how
PWSs and emergency managers can increase information sharing.
The introduction to this study provided an overview of PWSs and how non-emergency
managers have historically provided risk reduction techniques. The introduction also included
the stated goals of emergency managers and demonstrated that reducing risk associated with
PWSs is included within the scope of emergency management. There are a number of technical
and administrative problems that contribute to increased risk associated with PWSs. However,
the main problem that this study is addressing is the emergent nature of the relationship between
emergency management and PWSs.
This study is predicated on the assumption that the current level of risk to drinking water
is sufficient to justify a maturation of the relationship between emergency management and
PWSs. It is possible that, due to issues such as aging infrastructure, PWSs may face increased
risk in the future. Additionally, this study evaluates the relationship between social vulnerability
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and drinking water risk. If social vulnerability is related to risk, then future trends associated
with social vulnerability may increase the need for improved relationships between emergency
managers and PWSs. Overall, future trends associated with drinking water risk are likely to be
jurisdiction-dependent. For example, the state of California, through Senate Bill 1398 (2016), are
pursuing legislation to eliminate all lead service lines within their border.
The nature and quantity of resources and methodologies by which communities mitigate,
prepare, respond, and recover from drinking water-related emergencies is evolving. This research
effort is a case study to identify potential methods of reducing risks associated with PWSs. The
first goal is to quantitatively evaluate meta-data, focusing on two particular states, to potentially
identify relationships that may facilitate risk assessments of PWSs. The second goal is to conduct
a review of existing literature related to emergency management in order to ascertain existing
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery techniques and strategies. In addition to the
academic publications such as those cited in this study, the literature includes
governmental resources. A preliminary pull of governmental documents to prepare this study
resulted in the identification of 212 relevant resources totaling 6,761 pages. Example tiles of
these documents include Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency
Management Agency (DHS & EPA, 2019), Inventory of EPA’s Tools for Enhancing Community
Resilience to Disasters (EPA, 2016a), and Connecting Water Utilities and Emergency
Management Agencies (EPA, 2018).
Significance of the Study
The four phases of emergency management are mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery (National Governors’ Association, 1979). This case study explored methodologies,

11

expressed in the literature, by which both PWSs and emergency managers engage throughout
each phase of emergency management. An overview of these methods may assist emergency
managers developing plans for their communities. In addition, three diverse datasets were
quantitatively assessed. This case study performed data analyses to explore potential
improvements to conducting vulnerability assessments. Meta-data from the existing large
datasets has not been widely analyzed. An exception was reported by Fedinick et al. (2019), who
evaluated the data from a social justice perspective. If relationships are identified among key
variables within the present study, then future research could be conducted to better explore the
phenomena.
This study aimed to identify existing techniques that emergency managers and water
utilities utilize to reduce risk throughout the four phases of emergency management. Areas for
increased collaboration were also identified. According to the SDWA (1974), PWSs assume
primary responsibility for all four phases of emergency management while primacy agencies
provide oversight. In the future, emergency managers may need to respond when public utilities
and primacy agencies fail in their basic duty to protect consumers. Increased collaboration
between emergency managers and PWSs may facilitate better outcomes for communities.
The incident in Flint, Michigan, was somewhat of a unique case, not just in the
magnitude of the impact on the community, but also in the sense that the proximate cause was a
switch to a new type of source water. This is not a frequent occurrence, as research for this case
study did not find any other recent examples of a PWS serving nearly 100,000 persons switching
their water source on a compressed timeline. While there is nothing inherently illegal or
improper about switching water sources, the project in Flint resulted in criminal charges against
individuals involved in the process (Booker, 2021). The project failed from an engineering
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perspective, and there was also an apparent cover-up that prevented earlier detection of the
failure (Egan, 2015). The apparent cover-up involved the state-level primacy agency as well as
the local PWS, which was also under management of the state government (Egan, 2015).
This case study is based, in part, on the assumption that there is room for improvement in
how communities manage such projects. Federal and applicable state regulations stipulate the
responsible parties in such projects—and it’s not emergency managers. This study, in accordance
with supporting literature, is based on the assumption that emergency managers can, however,
play some role, as opposed to no role. This study seeks to better delineate what that role may
entail with respect to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
This case study considers different types of drinking water-related emergencies that may
occur. Some water-related emergencies do not result in declared emergencies. These types of
incidents therefore not require immediate public notification. This may occur, for example, when
water sampling indicates a parameter exceeds a trigger level. Public reporting of these incidents
typically occurs once per year in the annual Consumer Confidence Report, as opposed to realtime notification. The next type of incident requires immediate public notification, but will not
result in a declaration of emergency. An example would be significant contamination levels
resulting from a backflow incident or operational error. An example of a third type of waterrelated emergency is a natural disaster that tangentially threatens the drinking water supply, for
example through damaged infrastructure or flooding. Flint, Michigan, was an example of a new
type of emergency—a declared emergency specifically relating to drinking water contamination.
Historically, drinking water incidents have not been managed under the auspices of
emergency management. Instead, the framework for mitigation, preparation, response, and
recovery has been guided for the last approximately half-century under the regulatory framework
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of the SDWA. Governmental publications and academic literature have emerged over the
decades that allude to a more comprehensive approach to reducing risk associated with public
water supplies. The EPA has directly made some recommendations on how emergency managers
and PWSs can better work together (EPA, 2018). This case study operated on the premise that
ambiguity remains as to how emergency managers can best facilitate reductions in risk to their
water supplies.
Emergency managers have, as discussed in the introduction, not historically been
participants in risk reduction efforts related to drinking water systems. In 2016, a federal disaster
was declared due to contaminated water. Given the stated purpose of emergency management
cited in the introduction, emergency managers cannot ignore disasters related to drinking water.
A key problem is that emergency management-related techniques to address drinking water
systems are still emerging. This paper seeks to utilize both quantitative and qualitative
techniques to ascertain how emergency managers can more successfully mitigate, prepare,
respond, and recover to drinking water incidents.
The academic literature, as well as government documents, provide information
regarding risk reduction associated with drinking water systems (EPA, 2014b; Switzer &
Teodoro, 2018). In addition, large data sets of drinking water-related data are publicly available,
from both public and private sources. This case study reviews the literature and quantitatively
assesses the datasets. This study provides an overview of the literature as well as an outline of
the methodology by which the quantitative data can be analyzed.
Why is this study going to focus on data from Texas and Illinois? The SDWA is
enforced at the state level. Therefore, comparing data regarding regulatory violations across state
lines may add a degree of uncertainty to the results. At least eight states both utilize propriety
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software to aggregate drinking water sampling data and publically display the resulting
information. The eight known states are: Texas, California, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Alaska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois. Texas and California are the largest states, and
therefore provide the most data points. Texas was selected for this study instead of California for
two reasons. First, it possesses a more diverse array of communities with respect to the Centers
for Disease Control SVI. Second, Texas provides more public information regarding its drinking
water program. The availability of additional information is likely to enhance the analysis of
quantitative findings. Illinois was selected because of its healthy mix of ground water and
surface water.
The Role of Environmental Justice
The body of environmental justice literature relating to drinking water and its associated
infrastructure has been growing in recent years (Fedinick et al., 2019; Switzer & Teodoro, 2018;
Balazs & Ray, 2014). The 2016 Flint, Michigan disaster appears to have been a focusing event
which provided increased attention to drinking water systems among researchers. A number of
these studies have particular relevance to social vulnerability and drinking water systems. Two
parameters were the focus of these studies. First, regulatory violations were analyzed. Second,
data associated with drinking water contaminants was studied. The results associated with these
two parameters were then compared with various indicators of social vulnerability such as race,
income, language spoken, or SVI. The CDC formally defines SVI as “the potential negative
effects on communities caused by external stresses on human health” (ATSDR, n.d., n.p.).
Fedinick et al. (2019) published the results of a multi-organizational study that researched
the linkage between drinking water violations and factors associated with vulnerability. The
report used descriptive data comparisons, rather than inferential statistical analyses, to evaluate
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the quantitative data. The primary conclusion was that regulatory “violations were more likely in
counties with racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability and subpar housing and transportation
quality” (p. 35). An article by Fedinick et al. (2019) was one of the few environmental justice
articles that specifically noted that distribution systems, in addition to treatment systems, require
attention with respect to risk mitigation efforts.
Switzer and Teodoro (2018) touched on a subject that may benefit from an expanded
analysis: local management of drinking water systems. Much like school districts, funding is
primarily local even if funding from higher levels of government may be available as a
supplement. In this sense, there is no federal or state-level drinking water system. States provide
regulatory oversight over systems, but they do not own or operate the systems. Switzer and
Teodoro (2018) discussed the implications of the local nature of PWSs. In addition, they
specifically addressed the issue of which specific parameters of social vulnerability were most
influential with respect to drinking water: class and race.
Several environmental justice articles (McDonald & Jones, 2018; Balazs & Ray, 2014)
discussed governmental interfaces with PWSs. The structure of local governments, funding
schemes, and oversight procedures all contribute to the overall effectiveness of PWSs.
McDonald and Jones (2018) included a discussion of EPA involvement with environmental
justice. Additionally, they discussed Government Accountability Office efforts and
recommendations to improve accuracy of the EPA Safe Drinking Water Information System
(SDWIS) (General Accountability Office, 2011). Balazs and Ray (2014), proposed a “Drinking
Water Disparities Framework” as an archetype for the drinking water industry (p. 603). The
Balazs and Ray model centered PWSs within three different types of environments: the natural
environment, the built environment, and the sociopolitical environment.
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All of the articles reviewed in this section, with the exception of Switzer and Teodoro
(2018), directly addressed the role of system size (as measured by population served) with
respect to negative outcomes for drinking water systems. In each case, small systems were noted
for having limited access to what Balazs et al. (2012) termed “technical, managerial and financial
(TMF) capacity” (p. 9). Balazs et al. (2011), in a study involving nitrate concentrations, found
that “[f]or large systems, we did not find significant associations between race/ethnicity or home
ownership and nitrate levels” (p. 1276). This is interesting, in that it suggested that larger
systems may be able to overcome challenges associated with increased social vulnerability
through TMF capacity. This case study considers SVI as one potential factor of negative
outcomes, and it also evaluates other potential sources of negative outcomes.
The negative outcomes that were quantitatively measured in the environmental justice
studies were of two general types: regulatory violations or contaminant levels. Balazs et al.
(2011) explicitly discussed, in reference to “both components of environmental justice,”
“compliance challenges as well as exposure to contaminants” (p. 2). There are multiple types of
regulatory violations, some of which are health-based and others which are not. For example, a
violation could be issued for failure to make proper notifications of certain events. In addition to
contaminants, a number of physical parameters may be water quality indicators. For example,
turbidity and pH are not contaminants but they do impact drinking water quality. All of the
studies evaluated restricted their analysis to contaminants, which are defined by 20 CFR part 141
(2021) as “any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water.” This
case study uses the convention of other studies, and focuses on indicators, rather than restricting
the evaluation to contaminants.
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Relationships between Water Utilities and Emergency Managers
The EPA has published multiple documents to assist PWSs with respect to disasters. For
example, a guide to mitigating against floods has been released (EPA, 2014b). Flooding is a
relatively common occurrence and it may occur simultaneously with a major natural disaster that
forces resources to be dispersed throughout the community. In addition, the AWIA guidance can
be used to identify potential threats which require mitigation (EPA, 2019a). Additional guidance
on potential mitigation requirements can be found in other documentation, such as the System
Measures of Water Distribution System Resilience (EPA, 2015b).
In this document, unless otherwise specified, the acronym Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) will refer to the federal-level EPA, as opposed to state-level equivalent agencies.
The EPA has published a guide for how “water utilities and emergency management agencies
can work together to better respond to emergencies” (EPA, 2018, p.1). This document primarily
gave suggestions on how water utilities and emergency managers can develop relationships to
facilitate collaboration during responses. For example, joint participation in training exercises
and tours of each other’s facilities were recommended. Shared administrative processes were
also discussed, such as providing water utilities space in emergency operations centers and
providing responder access badges to utility workers. Joint effort on emergency communication
to the public was also suggested.
The EPA (2018) also recommended joint planning to assist both in the mitigation and
preparedness phases of emergency management. This included sharing emergency response
plans, emergency operations plans, and county hazard mitigation plans. The focus of joint
planning efforts is to manage emergency water scenarios, with a particular focus on alternate
drinking water sources. Combined efforts may also enhance the mitigation phase of emergency
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management. For example, if a water utility identifies a particular vulnerability, then funding
sources could be pursued as a team.
Primacy agencies are typically run by state governments, normally through the equivalent
of a state-level EPA. Such agencies may have a variety of names, such as Department of
Environmental Protection or Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA has published
guidance for state-level EPAs to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from water-related
emergencies (EPA, 2013b). Mitigation guidance is geared toward utilizing existing funding
opportunities. However, no recommended methods of identifying hazards were suggested in the
document. For example, there was no recommendation to utilize data from sanitary surveys to
feed into the mitigation process. The remainder of the suggestions in the 2013 EPA guidance
related to developing specific response and recovery plans and checklists.
The EPA (EPA, 2014a) has provided some guidance regarding how to implement
physical security measures to defend against malicious tampering with the water supply. Basic
recommendations included fencing, locks, and proper lighting. Enhanced guidance was provided
to assist water utilities to implement the AWIA. Later, the EPA (2019a; 2019b) produced
additional guidance to protect against malevolent acts against PWSs. This recent guidance was
more comprehensive in that it covered all aspects of security, including natural disasters and
cyber-attacks. The EPA also supported a Water Network Tool for Resilience that assists with all
aspects of maintaining operations at a PWS (Klise et al., 2017). Guidance has also been
published regarding remote sensing of water systems as early warning for contamination (EPA,
2016a).
The federal government provides substantial guidance for the response phase of
emergency management. For example, the EPA has published a detailed “Incident Action
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Checklist” for flooding (EPA, 2015a, p. 1). Additionally, guidance is available for the emergency
disinfection of water (EPA, 2017). If proper planning is completed, then the response phase of a
water emergency can be straightforward. Difficulty may arise, however, when communities do
not properly plan or if they plan for the wrong scenarios. In addition to responding to
emergencies, proper communication to the public is critical. The CDC has published guidance to
assist PWSs with this type of communication (CDC, 2016).
On June 4, 2019, the EPA and FEMA released a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
to address funding associated with PWSs after a disaster (EPA, 2019b). The primary goal of the
MOU was to increase the speed with which funding is made available to the community to begin
recovering. Previously, the money would have needed to be fronted; then, assistance could be
applied for after the fact. The new arrangement quickly makes loans available to pay for
recovery. The loans must be matched by the state. The partnership between the EPA and FEMA
works through the existing framework of state revolving funds, which are depicted schematically
in Figure 2.
The EPA Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) was authorized by the Clean
Water Act amendments (1987). The CWSRF made two fundamental changes to the way the
federal government assisted funding of local water projects. First, instead of grants, the program
began issuing primarily loans. Second, states were placed in charge of managing their programs
instead of the federal government. Federal funds were applied to the programs, then states fund a
20% match. The EPA refers to “51 state-level infrastructure ‘banks’” that issue loans for projects
(EPA, 2015c, p. 5). Their operation is shown in Figure 2 below, adapted from the EPA (2015c).
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Figure 2
Clean Water State Revolving Fund Cash Flows

Literature Review
Large technical systems (LTSs) consist of infrastructure that enable “a myriad of social
changes, for good or worse” (Van der Vleuten, 2004, p. 396). LTSs are large-scale networks
responsible for functions such as power production or the provision of drinking water (Roe et al.,
2004). LTSs encompass multiple organizations and are not represented by a single project,
company, or governmental entity. Anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and control of risk
within an LTS requires analysis of technical, social, and organizational factors (Kleiner et al.,
2015).
LTSs are multi-organizational institutions that provide vital services to the societies that
they serve (Perrow, 1999). Drinking water systems, based upon Perrow’s definition, are one type
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of LTS. LTSs require an established cadre of reliability professionals to assure reliability on
behalf of the public (Perrow, 1999). Several theories, such as normal accident theory (NAT) and
high reliability theory (HRT) have developed to analyze and assure the reliability of LTSs. NAT
theorizes that failures are inevitable while HRT suggests that failures can be largely prevented
(Perrow, 1994, La Porte, 1994). The failure of a drinking water system can result in a public
emergency, as evidenced by the 2016 disaster in Flint, Michigan. Trained reliability
professionals are required to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from emergencies.
Drinking water utilities, similar to fires, present potential risk to communities. However,
fires are much more likely to result in declarations of emergency when they cause extensive
damage. This literature review discusses the role of water utilities within the framework of
disasters. Drinking water systems may result in disaster when they are disrupted, contaminated
from the source, or during backflow incidents. Each phase of emergency management must be
considered with respect to drinking water systems.
The design, maintenance, and oversight of LTSs requires a diverse cadre of reliability
professionals. Reliability professionals may have requirements such as education, training,
experience, or professional certification. Building codes, legal requirements, and professional
codes of ethics are some of the structures which govern reliability professionals that work with
LTSs. A duty to protect the public safety is inherent in these professions, and failures may entail
severe consequences. Examples of reliability professionals within the drinking water industry
include professional engineers, governmental regulators, and drinking water system operators.
A partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island in Middletown,
Pennsylvania in 1979 was “the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant
operating history (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018, p.1).” In 1981, a book titled Accident
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at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Sills et al., 1981) on the human aspects of the
situation was published. Two contributors to the book, Charles Perrow and Todd La Porte, later
developed different theories relating risk reduction within LTSs (Rijpma, 1997). Perrow (1994)
focused on the framework within which LTSs operate and La Porte (1994) worked toward
techniques to minimize risk.
Perrow (1999) proposed the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) in a text regarding safety
risks of LTSs. Perrow (1999) viewed the occurrence of accidents as a normal part of an LTS
lifecycle. Perrow considered two attributes of LTSs as being directly proportional to their risk
level: complexity and tight coupling. Complex systems are difficult to understand, manage, and
control. Tightly coupled systems enable errors to quickly compound when problems emerge.
According to Perrow, LTSs that are complex and tightly coupled will inevitably result in
periodic failures.
La Porte, working with a team at the University of California, Berkeley, developed what
later became known as HRT (Rijpma, 1997). Their initial progress stemmed from case studies
among the air traffic control system, electric power generation, and naval operations (Morgan,
2017). Christianson et al. (2011) distilled the five main tenants of highly reliable organizations:
“preoccupation with failure…, reluctance to simplify…, sensitivity to operations…, resilience…,
and deference to expertise” (p. 314).
The Flint, Michigan drinking water crisis was an example of an LTS failure. The disaster
demonstrated, for the first time, that impaired drinking water quality may result in a declared
emergency. Drinking water quality may be compromised by a variety of threats. Threats may
include the following: natural disasters, seasonal weather changes, failure to conduct proper
operations and maintenance, chemical contamination, terrorism, or cyber-attacks . Natural
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disasters may increase the risk to water systems through large-scale flooding and industrial-scale
contaminant releases. The methods by which drinking water risk reduction is incorporated into
the four phases of emergency management are still emerging.
Theoretical analysis of the breakdown of LTSs can be performed through both NAT and
HRT. NAT and HRT were developed in the 1980s, and continued to be refined in the 1990s and
beyond. NAT holds that accidents are inevitable in systems that are complex and tightly coupled.
HRT attempts to work in a complement with NAT and seeks to reduce risk to the greatest degree
possible. The drinking water industry has existing methods of mitigating, preparing, responding,
and recovering from disasters. Increasing relationships and information-sharing between water
utilities and emergency managers may reduce risk in the future.
Methods
The existing literature associated with both drinking water infrastructure and
environmental justice have informed this case study. Quantitative analysis of environmental
justice has become simplified through the development of the SVI. This study differs in its
quantitative analysis from previous research in four different ways. First, parameters for
violations are analyzed on both a raw and a per-capita basis. Second, this case study
encompasses two entire states and will exclude data from outside of those states. Studies cited in
the literature have typically analyzed either national data or localities smaller than a state. Data is
restricted to the state-level in this study because enforcement primacy and other significant
water-related programs operate at the state level. Third, this case study analyzes factors such as
source water type, number of regulatory site visits, and utilize multiple measures of system size.
In particular, analyses are performed for system size both based on PWS population served and
by number of facilities. Fourth, the case study factors both types of negative outcomes—
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regulatory compliance and contaminant levels. No Institutional Review Board approvals were
required for this case study, as there was no research involving human or animal test subjects.
Methodology
The purpose of this case study was to identify methods of risk reduction associated with
drinking water emergencies and disasters. A qualitative review of the literature was conducted to
identify existing emergency management techniques to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover
from incidents. Additionally, a dataset has been compiled from portions of three large data
repositories. The dataset has been quantitatively analyzed to determine potential relationships
that could enhance water-related risk reduction efforts. The conclusion of the case study reveals
both implications and areas of future research.
This case study was based upon the conceptual framework in Figure 3 that describes
relationships between key nodes associated with drinking water infrastructure. The conceptual
framework is presented in Figure 3. PWSs treat raw water, whether ground or surface water, and
are overseen by regulators. PWSs produce potable water for consumers. Potable water is not
pure, and normally contains low levels of contaminants. PWSs may generate regulatory
violations, by producing excess levels of contaminants or by other actions such as improper
management. The communities that consume water from a PWS may be characterized based
upon their social vulnerability. This case study utilized the CDC SVI as the measure of social
vulnerability.
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Figure 3
Conceptual Framework

PWSs are part of the American infrastructure, and they are responsible for delivering
potable water to communities. Disruption to the supply of potable water may indirectly result
from disasters. However, disruption to the supply of potable water caused by a PWS could also
independently create an emergency. The conceptual framework provides a simplified overview
of the parameters that may be related to PWS risk levels. This study utilized three existing
databases to evaluate the relationship between each of the parameters and negative outcomes.
Research Question
How can emergency managers improve risk reduction efforts associated with drinking
water infrastructure through analysis of practices and meta-data within the emergency
management literature?
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Hypotheses
Hypotheses Group 1: Social Vulnerability
The first group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between social
vulnerability and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a separate null hypothesis,
listed below. (Hypotheses with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a population of 10,000 or
greater due to limited data availability.) The ten null hypotheses are as follows:
•

There is no relationship between SVI and population served.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and quantity of regulator site visits.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and quantity of regulator site visits per capita.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and regulatory violations.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and regulatory violations per capita.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and number of contaminants exceeding health

•

guidelines*.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and levels of chloroform*.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and levels of disinfection byproducts*.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and levels of nitrate*.

•

There is no relationship between SVI and levels of arsenic*.

The null hypotheses were created to test the relationship between SVI and other factors. The
formulation of the null hypotheses is not intended to prejudge whether the hypotheses will be
accepted or rejected. Social vulnerability could possibly be related to the attention of regulators
and therefore water quality. Regulator attention can be tracked based on the number of site visits
made to each PWS. It is also possible to track and analyze the number of regulatory violations
that are assigned to each PWS. Water quality may also be impacted by the degree of community
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vulnerability. It is not possible to fully determine the impact of social vulnerability on regulatory
attention or water quality without quantitatively evaluating the data.
Regulator attention to PWSs can be evaluated though the use of metrics. Regulatory
violations track identified problems attributed to a PWS. It is possible that vulnerable
communities have more violations due to lack of ability to self-fund their PWSs. However, it is
also possible that vulnerable communities have fewer violations because regulators do not bother
to show up to their facilities in order to provide an evaluation. There is no available data to track
violations that were not identified by regulators. However, it is possible to track the number of
regulatory visits that were received by each PWS. A quantitative analysis will determine the
relationship between community vulnerability and the both number of regulatory site visits and
the number of violations.
Water quality data is available and can be analyzed based on the associated social
vulnerability index. However, until the data is analyzed it is not possible to know if any
relationships exist. It is possible that vulnerable communities have lower water quality.
However, it is also possible that wealthy areas have worse water quality. Poor water quality may
be an indicator of a current or past industrial base that provides (or provided) a robust economy.
In that case, poor water quality may essentially be a tradeoff for a more favorable social
vulnerability index. It is also possible that due to regulations all communities have a similar level
of water quality.
Hypotheses Group 2: Source Water Type
The second group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between source
water type and nine other factors. Each of those relationships has a separate null hypothesis,
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listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a population of 10,000 or
greater due to limited data availability.) The nine null hypotheses are as follows:
•

There is no relationship between source water type and quantity of regulator site visits.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and quantity of regulator site visits
per capita.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and number of violations.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and number of violations per capita.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and number of contaminants
exceeding health guidelines*.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and levels of chloroform*.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and levels of disinfection
byproducts*.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and Levels of nitrate*.

•

There is no relationship between source water type and levels of arsenic*.
Only 2.5% of Earth’s water is freshwater (United States Geological Survey, n.d.).

“Precipitation is the ultimate source of all fresh-water resources, [although] most of it never
enters an aquifer or runs off into a stream” (Foster, 1988, p. 6). A significant portion of
precipitation is evaporated back into the atmosphere and much of it is also captured by
vegetation and then released through transpiration. Precipitation that saturates below the water
table is available for use as ground water.
It is possible that ground water will have fewer contaminants and fewer violations
because it is better protected from the environment. However, it is also possible that modern
practices will enable surface water to achieve the same levels of water quality as surface water. It
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is also possible that because surface water is more complex to treat that those systems will be
more prone to regulatory violations.
Hypotheses Group 3: PWS System Size (measured by population served)
The third group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between PWS system
size (measured by population served) and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a
separate null hypothesis, listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a
population of 10,000 or greater due to limited data availability). The ten null hypotheses are as
follows:
•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
quantity of regulator site visits.

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
quantity of regulator site visits per capita.

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
number of violations.

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
number of violations per capita.

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
social vulnerability index.

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
levels of chloroform*
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•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
levels of disinfection byproducts*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
levels of nitrate*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by population served) and
Levels of arsenic*
Larger PWSs typically have access to more resources and larger technical staffs. It is

therefore possible that larger PWSs therefore have higher water quality and fewer regulatory
violations. Several metrics are available to determine the size of a system. The population served
is one determinant of the size of a PWS. It is possible, given a common regulatory framework,
that all systems will produce a similar quality of water. It is also possible that the size of a system
is unrelated to the number of regulatory violations.
Hypotheses Group 4: PWS System Size (measured by number of facilities)
The fourth group of hypotheses tests whether there is a relationship between PWS system
size measured by number of facilities) and ten other factors. Each of those relationships has a
separate null hypothesis, listed below. (Parameters with an asterisk* only apply for PWSs with a
population of 10,000 or greater due to limited data availability.) The ten null hypotheses are as
follows:
•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Quantity of regulator site visits

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Quantity of regulator site visits per capita
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•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Number of violations

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Number of violations per capita

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Social vulnerability index

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Levels of chloroform*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Levels of disinfection byproducts*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Levels of nitrate*

•

There is no relationship between PWS system size (measured by number of facilities) and
Levels of arsenic*
Larger PWSs typically have access to more resources and larger technical staffs. It is

therefore possible that larger PWSs therefore have higher water quality and fewer regulatory
violations. Several metrics are available to determine the size of a system. The number of
facilities is one determinant of the size of a PWS. Additionally, the population served is another
metrics for the size of a PWS.
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Data Collection
The quantitative data set for this project was compiled from three separate sources. The
first data source, providing information on PWSs, is the EPA SDWIS. Second, the EWG Tap
Water Database contains information regarding water quality. Third, the CDC SVI is published
to characterize communities across the United States. Data from all three sources were compiled
to enable quantitative analysis to evaluate the hypotheses set forth in this study.
Quantitative Analyses to be Performed
Source Water Type vs Parameters
This analysis is based on a two-tail z-test for comparing two means. Steps are as follows:
•

Step 1: Determine descriptive statics: average, median, standard deviation, number of
samples

•

Step 2: Select a significance level (α)
o Note: This study utilizes α = 0.05

•

Step 3: Calculate the z-score, where:

o z = z-score
o x₁ = mean of sample 1
o x₂ = mean of sample 2
o Δ = hypothesized difference between means (0 if testing null hypothesis)
o σ₁ = standard deviation of population 1
o σ₂ = standard deviation of population 2
o n₁ = size of population 1
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o n₂ = size of population 2
•

Step 4: Determine probability from a z-table and multiply by two, because the test is twotailed.

•

Step 5: Compare the probability to the significance level. If the probability is less than
the significance level, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis
fails to be rejected.

Social Vulnerability, PWS Population, and PWS Number of Facilities vs Parameters
This analysis is based on Pearson’s correlation coefficient, used to measure the
relationship between two variables. Steps are as follows:
•

Step 1: Determine descriptive statics: average, median, standard deviation, number of
samples

•

Step 2: Select a significance level (α)
o α = 0.05

•

Step 3: Calculate Pearson correlation coefficient (r)
o Note: use “PEARSON” function in Microsoft Excel

•

Step 4: Determine number of pairs of data (n)

•

Step 5: Calculate degrees of freedom (n-2)

•

Step 6: Calculate the t-statistic (t)

o t = t-statistic
o r = Pearson correlation coefficient
o n = Number of pairs of data
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•

Step 7: Determine the probability p-value (p)
o Note: use “TDIST” function in Microsoft Excel (within Excel x = t and input 2
tails)

•

Step 8: Compare the probability to the significance level. If the probability is less than
the significance level, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Otherwise, the null hypothesis
fails to be rejected.

Expected Outcome
This case study seeks to identify potential resources and methodologies by which
communities may collectively improve their ability to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover
from drinking water-related emergencies. It is proposed that gaps may be identified. It might also
be possible that areas for increased collaboration between emergency managers and the drinking
water industry will be identified. The quantitative analyses are expected to determine the utility
of water industry meta-data. If relationships between key variables are identified, then riskreduction recommendations could be generated or future research opportunities could be
proposed.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations that apply to this case study. First, the literature review
and the databases that form the basis of the quantitative portion of this study are limited to
publicly available resources. Second, the databases that are utilized as part of the study each have
internal limitations. For example, the SDWIS database relies on input from state-level regulators.
Third, the researcher did not have access to internal stakeholders within PWSs, state regulatory
agencies, or federal agencies. These limitations are likely to contribute to the need for further
research upon completion of this case study.
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Methods Summary
The methods of this case study are designed to answer the research question: How can
emergency managers improve risk reduction efforts associated with drinking water infrastructure
through analysis of practices and meta-data within the emergency management literature? In
order to frame the question, a conceptual framework is presented. The conceptual framework
visually displays the relationships between PWSs and both their dependent and independent
variables. A description of source information is then provided. First, it is acknowledged that the
answer to the research question stems from the work of previous scholarly output. In addition,
quantitative data sources from three databases are described. The remainder of the methodology
section describes how the source materials could be used to answer the research question.
The methods section describes the compilation of the data set. The source data is derived
from three different databases. An EPA database lists groundwater type, number of violations,
and size-related data associated with each PWS. A database from a non-profit organization
provides data regarding water quality for each large PWS serving over 10,000 consumers. A
third database is provided by the CDC to identify the SVI of the county in which each PWS is
located. A single database was compiled to merge data from each of the three listed databases.
The hypotheses are presented as well as the statistical techniques that are used to evaluate
the data. The presentation of the hypotheses provides an overview of potential relationships
between variables. The display of the statistical techniques discloses the methods by which the
data is analyzed. The presentation of the hypotheses and quantitative analysis techniques may
facilitate future studies that could be conducted to build upon this case study. The expected
outcome of this study is to identify methods by which water-related disasters could be minimized
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in the future. The methods section also includes a discussion of the limitations of the study. All
computations were performed using Microsoft Excel.
Quantitative Results
Quantitative results were produced for two different states: Illinois and Texas. The
results are presented below, based on the independent variables. The availability of results from
two different states helps illuminate the relationships between the respective dependent and
independent variables. Future studies may expand on the datasets to include all states, territories,
and tribal lands. Many of the relationships between variables were consistent between Illinois
and Texas, although some diverged.
Hypothesis 1: Social Vulnerability Index vs Parameters
Table 1
Hypothesis Group 1: Social Vulnerability Index v. Parameters
Independent
Variable

SVI

Illinois

Texas

Dependent Variable

PWSs Analyzed

Significant
difference?

Relationship

Significant
Difference?

Relationship

Quantity reguator site visits
Regulator site visits per capita
Quantity regulatory violations
Regulatory violations per capita
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines
Levels of arsenic
Levels of chloroform
Levels of nitrate
Levels of disinfection byproducts

All
All
All
All
Large*
Large*
Large*
Large*
Large*

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No

Proportional
None
Proportional
None
Proportional
None
None
Porportional
None

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Proportional
None
Proportioanl
Proportional
None
Proportional
None
Proportional
None

Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers.
SVI was first evaluated in comparison to the PWS population served. In the state of
Illinois, a larger population served was proportional to a higher SVI. For Illinois, the p-value for
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient test was 6.48 * 10-9. In contrast, the p-value for the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient test for Texas was 0.23, which is not statistically significant.
The data was suggestive that in Illinois larger communities have a higher SVI, while in Texas
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SVI is more evenly distributed based on population size. In other words, poverty and other social
ills may be more concentrated in Illinois than in Texas. Given the difference between the results
from different states, the suggestion is that some states may have a relationship between
population served and SVI, while others do not. Future research that evaluates data on a national
level might more definitely delineate the relationship between population served and SVI.
SVI was next compared to the quantity of regulator site visits as well as the quantity of
regulator site visits per capita. Initially, it was not known whether elevated SVI would correlate
to more attention from regulators. Would regulators provide more attention to well-off areas or
disadvantaged areas? The data regarding the total number of site vests indicated that higher SVI
communities receive more visits. The p-value for the Pearson’s correlation coefficient test for
Texas was 4.05 * 10-24 and for Illinois it was 7.2 * 10-56, both indicating statistically significant
relationships. Alternately, for visits per capita, there was no statistically significant relationship
in Texas or Illinois, with p-values of 0.22 and 0.16, respectively. This indicates that, on a per
capita basis, the relative SVI of a PWS does not seem to influence the quantity of regulator site
visits.
The first potential anomaly with the Hypothesis 1 data set that deserved attention involved
a potential data discrepancy associated with system size. SVI is related to number of site visits
on an absolute basis in both states, and is simultaneously not related to per capita number of site
visits in either state, indicating that there should be a relationship between population size and
SVI. This is true in Illinois where the population served was directly proportional to SVI.
However, in Texas, there was no relationship between SVI and population served. This anomaly
could best be overcome with future research analyzing all available data on a national level.
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SVI was also compared to the total number of regulatory violations as well as the quantity
of violations per capita. Higher-SVI systems received more violations in both Texas and Illinois,
with p-values from Pearson’s correlation coefficient test of 1.56 * 10-6 and 0.03, respectively.
The split between Texas and Illinois with respect to violations per capita is a potential second
anomaly with the Hypothesis 1 data set. In Texas, higher-SVI systems were more likely to
receive regulatory violations on a per capita basis. In Illinois, there was no relationship between
SVI and the number of violations per capita. In Texas and Illinois, the SVI to regulatory
violation p-values from the Pearson’s correlation coefficient tests were, respectively, 0.02 and
0.05. The 0.05 p-value for Illinois was nearly low enough to indicate a relationship, which
seems to resolve the apparent anomaly. A future study, with national-level data, would provide
more conclusive findings.
There was a significant positive relationship between SVI and the number of contaminants
exceeding EWG health guidelines in Illinois (p-value = 0.02). However, there was no such
relationship in Texas (p-value = 0.14). There was no relationship between SVI and chloroform in
either Illinois or Texas, with p-values of 0.33 and 0.98, respectively. Likewise, there was no
relationship between SVI and levels of disinfection byproducts in either Illinois or Texas, with
respective p-values of 1.01 and 0.41. In Texas, there was a positive relationship between levels
of arsenic and SVI, with a p-value of 0.00. Alternately, in Illinois there was no relationship
between SVI and arsenic, with a p-value of 0.09. There was a relationship between SVI and
nitrate in both Illinois and Texas, with respective p-values of 0.01 and 0.00.
The third and fourth potential anomalies with the Hypothesis 1 data set related to why the
Illinois and Texas data differed with respect to the relationship between SVI and both the
number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines and arsenic. In Illinois there was a
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significant relationship between SVI and number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines
while there was no such relationship in Texas. Alternately, Texas experienced a relationship
between SVI and arsenic while there was no such relationship in Illinois. The best method to
explore these anomalies would be to conduct a future study utilizing national-level data.
Hypothesis 2: Source Water Type vs Parameters
Table 2
Hypothesis Group 2: Source Water Type v. Parameters
Independent
Variable

Source Water
Type

Illinois
Dependent Variable

PWSs Analyzed

Quantity reguator site visits
Regulator site visits per capita
Quantity regulatory violations
Regulatory violations per capita
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines
Levels of arsenic
Levels of chloroform
Levels of nitrate
Levels of disinfection byproducts

All
All
All
All
Large*
Large*
Large*
Large*
Large*

Texas

Significant
Significant
Relationship
Difference?
difference?
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers.
The data indicated that there was no relationship between source water type and the
parameters. In other words, source water type had no relationship to either regulatory violations
or water quality. The absence of relationships was, in itself, an interesting finding. The absence
of relationships indicated that modern administrative and technical systems are sufficient to
overcome the increased challenges of treating surface water. These findings indicated that future
research should focus more on SVI and system size than ground water type.

Relationship
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
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Hypothesis 3: PWS System Size (population served) vs Parameters
Table 3
Hypothesis Group 3: PWS System Size (measured by population served) v. Parameters
Independent
Variable

System Size
(Population
Served)

Illinois
Texas
Dependent Variable
PWSs Analyzed Significant
Significant
Relationship
Relationship
difference?
Difference?
Quantity reguator site visits
All
Yes
Proportional
Yes
Proportional
Regulator site visits per capita
All
Yes
Inverse
Yes
Inverse
Number of violations
All
Yes
Proportional
No
None
Number of violations per capita
All
Yes
Inverse
No
None
SVI
All
No
None
No
None
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines
Large*
No
None
Yes
Proportional
Levels of arsenic
Large*
Yes
Inverse
No
None
Levels of chloroform
Large*
No
None
No
None
Levels of nitrate
Large*
No
None
No
None
Levels of disinfection byproducts
Large*
No
None
No
None

Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers.
The data showed that larger systems, measured by number of facilities, received more
regulatory attention, in the form of site visits. P-values were 0.00 and 5.22 * 10-29 for Illinois and
Texas, respectively. In addition, the quantity of site visits per capita were both statistically
significant in Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 2.75 * 10-80 and 4.87 * 10-6, respectively. As
would have been predicted by the literature, smaller systems received more regulatory attention
on a per capita bases. The data does not indicate that further research into these relationships is
warranted.
The data also indicated that there was no relationship between system size and SVI, with
p-values of 0.76 and 0.23 for Illinois and Texas, respectively. Illinois data indicated a
relationship between system size and regulatory violations on an absolute and per capita basis,
with respective p-values of 1.77 * 10-6 and 6.39 * 10-46. As would have been predicted by the
literature, smaller systems received more attention on a per capita basis. The first potential
anomaly in the data was represented by the fact that the Texas data differed from Illinois in that
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there were no relationships between system size and either the absolute number of violations or
violations per capita, with p-values of 0.30 and 0.08, respectively. The potential anomaly could
be resolved by future research that utilizes national-level data.
The data indicated that there were no relationships in Texas or Illinois between system
size and chloroform, nitrate, or disinfection byproducts. However, as would be predicted by the
qualitative literature, there was an inverse relationship with respect to arsenic in Illinois, with a
p-value of 0.04. A second potential anomaly with the Hypothesis 3 data is that while this
relationship existed in Illinois, there was no relationship between system size and arsenic in
Texas. This potential anomaly could be resolved through future research that involves analyzing
national-level data.
A third potential anomaly with Hypothesis 3 data was that there was a relationship
between system size and number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines in Texas but not in
Illinois, with p-values of 0.01 and 0.18, respectively. This anomaly could likely be resolved with
future data utilizing national-level data. However, a more problematic fourth anomaly also
presented itself with these same data points. The qualitative literature indicated that there should
be fewer contaminants exceeding health guidelines in larger systems, while the data for Texas
showed the opposite. A future study utilizing national-level data may provide some insight into
this finding. However, the inconsistency with the qualitative literature also calls into question the
reliability of the underlying data.
The underlying data came from a third-party non-profit organization that relies largely
on publicly available data. It is possible that larger systems have more data available, which
gives the appearance that more contaminants exceed guidelines. Smaller systems may therefore
be under-represented in the underlying data. However, it is also possible that the data is accurate,
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and that other factors may be contributing to increased levels of contaminants in the larger
systems. For example, if industrial water contamination sources are more prevalent in larger
communities, then it may contributed to decreased water quality.
Hypothesis 4: PWS System Size (number of facilities) vs. Parameters
Table 4
Hypothesis Group 4: PWS System Size (measured by number of facilities) v. Parameters
Independent
Variable

System Size
(Number of
Facilities)

Illinois
Texas
PWSs Analyzed Significant
Significant
Relationship
Relationship
difference?
Difference?
Quantity reguator site visits
All
Yes
Proportional
Yes
Proportional
Regulator site visits per capita
All
Yes
Inverse
Yes
Inverse
Number of violations
All
Yes
Proportional
No
None
Number of violations per capita
All
yes
Inverse
Yes
Inverse
SVI
All
No
None
Yes
Proportional
Number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines
Large*
Yes
Proportional
Yes
Proportional
Levels of arsenic
Large*
No
None
No
None
Levels of chloroform
Large*
No
None
No
None
Levels of nitrate
Large*
Yes
Inverse
Yes
Inverse
Levels of disinfection byproducts
Large*
No
None
No
None
Dependent Variable

Note. *Large systems serve 10,000 or more consumers.
System size, measured by the number of facilities, was proportional to the quantity of
regulator site visits in both Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 0.00 and 9.88 * 10-132,
respectively. In addition, the system size and regulator site visits per capita were inversely
proportional in both Illinois and Texas, with p-values of 2.74 * 10-80 and 3.12 * 10-30,
respectively. These findings are consistent with what would be expected in accordance with the
qualitative literature.
A first potential anomaly for Hypothesis 4 appears because in Illinois there is a
proportional relationship between system size and number of violations, with a p-value of 1.76 *
10-6 while there is no statistical relationship in Texas, with a p-value of 0.61. This anomaly could
be resolved through a future study utilizing a national-level data set. As would be expected by a
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review of the qualitative literature, there is an inversely proportional relationship between system
size and number of violations per capita in both states. P-values for Illinois and Texas were 6.39
* 10-46 and 6.00 * 10-6, respectively. There was a proportional relationship between system size
and SVI in Texas, with a p-value of 0.03, although there was no relationship in Illinois, with a pvalue of 0.76. This second potential anomaly, the difference in SVI relationships between Texas
and Illinois, could likely be resolved by a future study utilizing national-level datasets.
No relationships were identified between system size and arsenic, chloroform, or
disinfection byproduct levels in either Texas or Illinois. There are statistically significant
inversely proportional relationships in both Illinois and Texas between system size and nitrate
levels. For nitrate levels, the p-value in Illinois is 0.01 and in Texas it is 0.02. In both Illinois and
Texas there were significant relationships between system size and number of contaminants
exceeding health guidelines. The p-value in Illinois was 0.02 and in Texas it was also 0.02. This
data represents a third potential anomaly with Hypothesis 4 because the qualitative literature
would predict that the relationship should be inversely proportional, rather than proportional.
This could be because of problems with the underlying data. Alternately, it could indicate that
previous assumptions regarding the relationship between system size and water quality could
require revision.
Discussion
This case study utilized a literature review and quantitative techniques to determine how
to better engage in drinking water mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. An extended
literature review was able to identify technical and administrative guidance in the literature. Such
guidance applies to different audiences, such as drinking water consumers, primacy agencies,
and states, local governments, and water systems. Additionally, the quantitative portion of the
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study was able to elicit a determination as to whether the hypotheses discussed in the methods
section were rejected or failed to be rejected.
Technical and Administrative Guidance in the Literature
Bushe (2009) highlighted the need for successful organizational learning, in order to help
“groups, large and small, learn from their collective experience (p. 19).” Toward that goal, the
literature included both technical and administrative guidance to water operators to promote
resilient systems. The guidance related to mitigation, preparedness, and response. Technical and
administrative guidance within the literature has the potential to serve as a basis for institutional
knowledge that can be shared throughout the drinking water industry.
Various authors have prepared a body of documents that provide technical guidance to
the water industry. In particular, response-based documents were geared toward immediate
actions after an incident presents itself. However, other technical guidance focused on mitigation
and preparedness with an emphasis on administrative techniques. A survey of this literature may
be utilized to better understand methods to reduce human health risks associated with drinking
water systems.
The concept of organizational learning is challenging when applied to an entire industry.
The drinking water industry is much larger than individual stakeholders such as PWSs,
regulators, or personnel. The federal government, as a stakeholder, is somewhat unique within
the drinking water industry. The federal government serves multiple functions such as a
knowledge repository, an issuer of regulations, and it also retains many enforcement and
response authorities. Complicating the issue, in 49 states it is state governments that retain
primacy for enforcement of the SDWA. In Flint, Michigan, state regulators were not successful
in preventing the 2016 disaster in the city of Flint. A review existing guidance designed to bridge
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knowledge gaps may reveal insight into knowledge-sharing functions and reveal gaps in
knowledge.
This study analyzed emergency management-related technical and administrative
guidance from the literature geared toward different audiences. The audiences include the
following: drinking water consumers, primacy agencies, and states, local governments, and
water systems. Drinking water consumers are the private citizens and businesses that utilize
potable water from municipal sources. Primacy agencies are governmental entities that are
responsible for enforcing the SDWA. States, local governments, and water systems are entities
that are typically involved in the production and distribution of drinking water. The review
presented below attempts to distill the key points of the literature for each audience.
Drinking Water Consumers
Private citizens are advised to store “at least one gallon per person, per day,” ideally to
cover a two-week period (FEMA, 2004, p. 7). The stored water would be used during
emergencies for both hydration and personal hygiene. Therefore, for example, a household of
four could fulfill this requirement by having 25 cases of bottled water on hand, assuming 12ounce containers with 24 containers per case. Families may lower risk by storing water in a
climate-controlled setting and ensuring stock rotation.
Private citizens are also expected to follow all drinking water-related guidance from their
purveyor and governmental authorities. A relatively common recommendation made to
consumers is to boil water. Boiling water has the ability to reduce risk associated with microbial
contamination. Such guidance may come in the form of an advisory or notice. The CDC (2016)
published a guide that describes various phrases and types of communication that can be used to
inform water consumers of risks and either recommended or required precautions.
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A 2021 winter storm in Texas highlighted a potential problem for consumers. In Austin,
for example, a boil water notice was issued (Austin Water, n.d.). A challenge for many
consumers across the state, many of whom were dealing with boil water orders, was that they
also had no electricity available. Consumers had unlimited tap water, although they were
required to boil it and did not have access to electricity. Alternate methods of water disinfection
utilize household bleach, iodine tables, or calcium hypochlorite (Department of the Army
Headquarters, 2015).
The federal government has been instrumental in promulgating guidance for drinking
water consumers during emergencies. EPA (2017) issued guidance for consumers on how to
perform emergency disinfection of drinking water. The EPA also referred to a joint FEMA and
American Red Cross publication titled Food and Water in an Emergency (2004). Additional
guidance for consumers can be found in Appendix B of the Centers for Disease Control Drinking
Water Advisory Communication Toolbox (2016). The technical aspects of water disinfection
were generally consistent, although there were several issues that could potentially generate
confusion.
The first potential area of confusion is that the guidance documents do not clearly
describe the authorities who may issue drinking water guidance. The EPA (2017) and FEMA
(2004) recommend to seek guidance from “local authorities (p. 1, p. 11).” This can be confusing
because two separate types of entities may issue drinking water notifications: federal, state, or
local officials with emergency authorities or public or private officials that own or operate a
regulated PWS. When the EPA and FEMA direct consumers to check with local authorities, it is
likely that not all consumers will understand the difference between local officials and water
purveyors. Will consumers who purchase water from a regulated PWS understand that they need
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to check with two different sets of local authorities prior to making a conclusion regarding their
water? Federal, state, and officials have responsibility over the whole community, including
consumers of PWSs, while water purveyors are only responsible for their own customers.
Additionally, most communities have some non-PWSs and many have multiple regulated PWSs.
The second potential area of confusion associated with federal guidance is that the
referenced documents did not delineate between declared emergencies and routine governmental
operations. The vast majority of drinking water incidents that result in public notification are not
declared emergencies. Until 2016, the United States had never declared a federal emergency
primarily related to drinking water (FEMA, n.d.). The bifurcated communication channels have
potential to sow confusion. One communication channel flows through governmental entities
with jurisdiction over the area in question. The second communication channel flows through the
water purveyor, which may be a private company. During declared emergencies, these
communication channels are ideally streamlined. However, during declared emergencies, advice
for consumers may differ depending on their water purveyor—users of household wells may
need to follow different advice than users of a municipal water system.
The third potential area of confusion associated with federal guidance is that advice to
consumers to disinfect and treat water at home is disjointed and incomplete. According to the
CDC, there are four types of notifications from a PWS to the public: informational, boil water,
do not drink, and do not use (CDC, 2016). However, EPA (2017) provided guidance on
“disinfection (p.1)” of water while FEMA (2004) discussed both “disinfection” and “treatment”
(p. 10). Although FEMA advised that treatment is recommended in addition to disinfection, no
procedures for treatment were offered. Also lacking is a discussion of the relationship between
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boil water notices and disinfection, as would have been applicable in the 2021 Texas snowstorm,
when many residents had no viable methods to boil water.
Business and private organizations also have unique challenges associated with water
disruptions, particularly as related to food operations. The resources and planning required for
continuity of operations for business is much more complex than for individuals or families.
Preparation for such eventualities may be accomplished through formal programs, such as the
National Fire Protection Association Standard 1600, Standard on Continuity, Emergency, and
Crisis Management (NFPA, 2019). Whether formal or ad hoc processes are used in response,
compliance with boil water orders is mandatory. This may require the use of licensed potable
drinking water tanker trucks, utilization of pre-washed fruits and vegetables, and increased use of
hand sanitizer (Houston Health Department, n.d.).
Primacy Agencies
Drinking water production is an established industry in the United States and around the
world. An assumption could be made that municipal professional engineers and commercial
vendors that install drinking water systems could be relied upon to install safe systems. In the
present, the oversight of new drinking water treatment facilities requires skilled review of
proposed designs. Several instances of failure of regulators to assure oversight in the design
review of new treatment systems have been documented in the literature.
The first example of problems in the design review of a new treatment system occurred at
the Fort Belknap Indian Community (FBIC) Drinking Water Treatment Plant. The tribal
government did not have primacy for SDWA enforcement, which made the EPA the primary
enforcement agency (EPA, 2013a). In 2007, the FBIC submitted plans for a new system, to the
EPA (EPA, 2013a). The EPA contracted with a technical organization to provide a design
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review. Multiple problems were identified with the design review, and the EPA notified the
FBIC of the issues. In 2009, $572,700 in federal funds associated with the ARRA were provided
for the project, even though the problems identified by the EPA contractors were not addressed
(EPA, 2013a). Upon completion of the project, the plant was not able to maintain “compliance
with the SDWA, specifically the Disinfection Byproduct Rule” (EPA, 2013a, p. 3).
The Flint, Michigan disaster in 2015 represents the second example of a primacy agency
failing to detect design flaws in a treatment system prior to a plant beginning operations. Paine
and Kushma (2016) stated the “Office of the Michigan attorney general…asserts that Flint’s
external water experts inaccurately declared the system to be operating in compliance with the
law and that a Department of Environmental Quality employee also fraudulently certified the
Flint water treatment plant (p. 5).” The state government, as primacy agency, had a duty to
review plans for the proposed system. Failure to provide a sufficient technical review of a system
prior to certification is an error of omission.
The two cited examples were both compounded failures. In each case, technical experts
working on behalf of a local municipal entity provided poor quality designs. In the FBIC
example, the primacy agency acknowledged they did not have sufficient technical capacity to
review the design and therefore contracted out the review. The contracted review accurately
detected problems, although the problems were not corrected prior to funding and completing the
project. Alternately, in Flint Michigan, the state never detected the design flaws in the proposal
submitted by the municipality. There was nothing inherently improper about using the Flint
River as a source of drinking water. However, certifying an improperly designed treatment plant
to produce water for public consumption led to a public health disaster.
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States, Local Governments, and Water Systems
States, local governments, and individual water systems have similar community-wide
opportunities to seek mitigation projects associated with drinking water. These entities have the
ability to collaborate to utilize a variety of federal funding and finance options. Federal options
include: “the EPA’s Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund, the Water Infrastructure
Improvements for the Nation Act grant programs, and the Water Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation Act financing program, as well as HUD’s Community Development Block Grants”
(Wheeler & Carson, 2019, p.1).
Conclusions
This case study sought to identify how emergency managers can improve risk reduction
efforts associated with drinking water infrastructure through analysis of practices and meta-data
within the emergency management literature. A qualitative review of the literature elicited
techniques for different audiences to improve risk reduction efforts. The targeted audience
includes drinking water consumers, primacy agencies, and states, local governments, and water
systems. In addition, quantitative data from three databases was compiled and analyzed to search
for relationships. The existing literature had presented largely qualitative assessments of such
relationships. This case study involved quantitative analysis of PWS-related relationships. The
most significant conclusions are presented below.
The most significant aspect of this study is that it documents an initial methodology that
enables a quantitative analysis of PWS performance. In contrast, previous studies have largely
focused on qualitative analysis. This case study presents comprehensive data for two states.
Although some interesting conclusions could be drawn from the data, it is apparent that the first
step in achieving the full power of this methodology would require a national-level dataset to be
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developed and analyzed. A second future step would be to publish this methodology in a peerreviewed publication in order to gain feedback on the procedures and to solicit potential
improvements to the methodology. Increasing the underlying dataset to include national-level
data and improving the methodology through academic collaboration would result in
improvements.
A third technique to improve the methodology, although implausible, would be to enact a
national requirement for PWSs to centrally upload all of their water sampling data. This case
study relied upon a database developed by an independent non-profit organization that collects
sampling data from PWSs. It is possible that larger systems are more likely to make their data
publicly available, which would mean they disproportionally have their negative attributes
documented. Do smaller systems have fewer problems, or are they simply not publicized as
well? The EWG cannot be faulted if their data is imperfect—they are independently funded and
have limited resources. If this country would like to better assess its PWS performance, it would
not be necessary to mandate any new water sampling. Instead, it could mandate PWSs to upload
mandatory sample results to a central data repository. Such a requirement would still be
expensive, even though it would not require any additional water sampling.
In general terms, the quantitative portion of this study indicated that source water type is
not a factor with respect to PWS performance while SVI and system size are factors. A summary
of these findings is qualitatively presented in Table 5 below. In Table 5, the nomenclature PWS
performance is a term that includes both regulatory violations and negative water quality
indicators. The results presented in Table 5 indicated that source water type does not have a
significant influence on PWS performance indicators. Increased SVI, however, was shown to be
related to increases in both regulatory violations and negative performance indicators. Smaller
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systems, measured based on number of facilities or population served, resulted in more
regulatory violations per capita. Although the data indicated a relationship between system size
and negative water quality indicators, the directionality of the results was mixed. Some data
indicated larger systems have more negative water quality indicators while other data indicated
the opposite. Significantly, all data in Table 5, except as noted with respect to system size versus
negative water quality indicators, was consistent with what would have been predicted based
upon a qualitative literature review.
Table 5
Summary of Quantitative Data Conclusions

Independent
Variable
Source Water Type

Relationship to
PWS
performance?
No

SVI

Yes

System Size

Yes

Negative PWS Performance Indicators
Regulatory Violations
N/A
Yes (Higher SVI = more
violations)
Yes (Smaller size = more
violations per capita)

Negative Water Quality
Indicators
N/A
Yes (Higher SVI = lower
quality)
Varies*

Note. *Differs from predictions based on qualitative literature review.
The most definitive aspect of the quantitative data review was that source water type was
not related to PWS performance or negative outcomes. The literature opened the possibility that
surface water may present more opportunities for increased violations or decreased water quality.
However, there appeared to be no such relationships. These results indicate that future research
should focus on either PWS size or SVI. The fact that source water type is a non-factor with
respect to PWS outcomes is an indicator that the water industry is been able to effectively
overcome the increased challenges associated with the treatment of surface water.
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The data from both Texas and Illinois indicated that elevated SVI resulted in increased
regulatory violations. In addition, in Illinois’ elevated SVI was related to both an increased
number of contaminants exceeding health guidelines and increased levels of nitrate. In Texas,
elevated SVI was related to increased levels of both arsenic and nitrate. Therefore, the data
indicated that elevated SVI is related to both increases in regulatory violations and lower
indicators of water quality. Expanding the study to include national-level data would generate
increased face validity of these results.
A future expansion of the underlying data set would need to occur in two separate
directions. First, all states territories, and tribal lands would need to be represented. Second, all
negative water quality indicators, not just the five used in this study, would need to be
incorporated. Prior to building out the dataset, the methodology should be subjected to peer
review. It is highly plausible that peer review would result in improved techniques for expanding
the data set.
System size, measured by either number of facilities or population served, is likely to
result in an increased number of regulatory violations per capita. However, the data was not as
straightforward with respect to negative water quality indicators. The data did indicate a
relationship between system size and negative water quality indicators. However, the
directionality of the results was mixed. For example, some data indicated that larger systems
have more problems, while other data indicated that smaller systems have more problems. As
previously suggested in this case study, the problem could be a result of data availability
problems associated with smaller systems. Additional research would need to be conducted to
analyze the precise relationships between system size and negative water quality indicators.
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Lastly, the quantitative findings of this study had no significant bearing on Flint,
Michigan or the ability to predict future similar scenarios in the future. The emergency
declaration in Flint in 2016 occurred during a change-over in the water source for a major city.
That is an extremely rare event, as major cities do not frequently change their water sources. The
quantitative findings, however, can shed light on the impact of SVI on negative PWS outcomes
during routine operations. PWSs in locations with elevated SVI can be assessed using the
methodology outlined in this case study. In the future, major engineering projects, such as the
one that occurred in Flint, Michigan require increased attention. The qualitative, not the
quantitative, portions of this case study may shed light on some potential risk reduction
opportunities. For example, this case study presented an example (other than Flint, Michigan)
where a primacy agency failed to provide oversight on a significant engineering project.
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